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Robert Leckey*

Identity, Law, and the Right to a Dream?

This paper engages critically with the new orthodoxy holding that individuals
have a "right" to know their genetic origins and that such knowledge is crucial
to realizing their identities. It examines two case studies: the Pratten litigation
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding anonymous
donor conception and scholarship approving a reform to Quebec's adoption law.
It addresses the supposed "identity gap" between those who are adopted or
donor-conceived and those who are neither Arguments for law reform exaggerate
that gap, opposing the incomplete, insecure identity of the adopted or donorconceived to the ostensibly complete, secure identity of those raised by their
putatively genetic parents. A result is to overstate what is distinct and harmful
about being adopted or donor-conceived. The paper also identifies a mistaken
perception of law's role in fashioning identity and recognizing family ties, including
what law does for those who are not adopted or donor-conceived and what it
might do for those who are. Some claims for law reform in the service of identity
expect more from law than it can or should provide.

Ce texte reponda la nouvelle orthodoxie selon laquelle I'individu detient un , droit ,
de connaitre ses origines et selon laquelle cette connaissance est essentielle a
la realisation de Iidentite individuelle. II etudie le cas de la reclamation menee
par Olivia Pratten sous la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes, a I'egard du
don anonyme de gametes, ainsi que la recherche scientifique a I'appui d'une
reforme au regime quebecois d'adoption. Le texte examine le suppose ecart
identitaire - entre ceux qui sont adoptes ou congus par don genetique anonyme
et ceux qui ne le sont pas. Les arguments pour des reformes du droit exagerent
cet ecart. Notamment, ils opposent Iidentite incomplete et precaire des adoptes
et de ceux qui sont congus par moyen de don genetique anonyme a celle, en
apparence complete et solide, de ceux qui sont censes 6tre eleves par leurs
parents genetiques. Le texte suggere que cette conception du prejudice propre
aux adoptes et a ceux qui sont congus par don genetique anonyme se retrouve
exageree par consequent. Par ailleurs, les discours favorables a une reforme du
droit vehiculent une perception erronee du r6le du droit quant a la construction
identitaire et a la reconnaissance des rapports familiaux. Cette erreur s'applique
tant a ce que fait le droit pour ceux qui ne sont ni adoptes ni congus par dons
genetiques qu'a ce qu'il pourrait faire pour ceux qui le sont. Motivees par le souci
identitaire, certaines reclamations laissent transparaitre des attentes du droit qui
excedent sa capacite ainsi que son r6le legitime.
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Introduction
The notions that individuals have a right to know their genetic origins and

that such knowledge is crucial to realizing their identities have become
widespread. In numerous jurisdictions, they infuse legal and policy
discourse. They also drive reforms to legislation and to clinical practice
regarding assisted reproduction and adoption. Indeed, they constitute a
new orthodoxy. Exemplifying "the glorification of genetic connections in
contemporary Western societies," 1 they represent a "'geneticisation' of the
popular imagination, such that now genes are increasingly believed to be
of overwhelming significance in every aspect of life." 2
Complementary to cautions that recognizing such a right may bear
disproportionately on particular kinds of families, such as ones headed by
single women or same-sex couples,3 this paper engages critically with this
new orthodoxy by addressing two intertwined issues. One is the supposed
"identity gap" between those who are adopted or donor-conceived and

1.

Tabitha Freeman, "Introduction" in Tabitha Freeman et al, eds, Relatedness in Assisted

Reproduction: Families, Origins and Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

[Freeman et al, Relatedness in AssistedReproduction] I at 8; see also Abby Lippman, "Worrying-and
Worrying about-the Geneticization of Reproduction and Health" in Gwynne Basen, Margrit Eichler
& Abby Lippman, eds, Misconceptions:The Social Constructionof Choice and the New Reproductive

and Genetic Technologies (Hull, QC: Voyageur Publishing, 1993) 39; Dorothy Nelkin & M Susan
Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon (Anm Arbor, MI: University of Michigan

Press, 2004).
2.

Petra Nordqvist & Carol Smart, Relative Strangers:Family Life, Genes and Donor Conception

(Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) at 4.
3.
See e.g. Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, "De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in
Canada: Some Doubts and Directions" (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 95 at 116-130; Angela Cameron, "A
Chip off the Old (Ice) Block? Women-Led Families, Sperm Donors, and Family Law" in Jennifer M
Kilty, ed, Within the Confines: Women and the Law in Canada (Toronto: Women's Press, 2014) 246.
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those who are neither.' Arguments for law reform exaggerate the gap
between those groups. Often implicitly, they oppose the incomplete,
insecure identity of adopted or donor-conceived individuals to the
ostensibly complete, secure identity of those raised by their putatively
genetic parents. The effect can be to construct a flattened, misleading
image of the identity formation of those who are not adopted or donorconceived. In the process, such arguments exaggerate what is distinct, and
harmful, about being adopted or donor-conceived. The second issue is a
mistaken perception of law's role in fashioning identity and recognizing
family ties, including what it does for those who are not adopted or donorconceived and what it might do for those who are. For instance, some calls
for law reform overstate the degree to which legal family statuses align
with lived experience.
This paper grounds its analysis in a close reading of two case studies,
each relating to a Canadian effort to change the law in the service
of identity.5 One is the first-instance judgment resulting from Olivia
Pratten's attempt, via litigation under the CanadianCharterofRights and
Freedoms,6 to force the Province of British Columbia to take measures
to collect, preserve, and disclose information for individuals conceived
using anonymously donated gametes.7 The other consists of scholarship
supporting an amendment to Quebec's adoption regime that would permit
legal bonds between the birth family and the child to survive the latter's
adoption. Using these case studies, this paper does not directly dispute
the idea of a "right to know one's origins." It neither doubts the sincerity
of some individuals' avowed longings to know,8 nor opposes particular
policy proposals. Rather, it focuses on the arguments advanced in support
of proposals, drawing out problematic and erroneous assumptions about
identity, law, and the connection between them.
It is worth anticipating skepticism or impatience on the part of readers
for whom it is axiomatic that information about an individual's genetic
origins simply is "his" or "hers." On that view, it matters little whether
4.
Freeman, supra note 1 at 15, notes "the limitations and inadequacies" of current language in this
domain, including the awkward term donor.
5. On discourse analysis in this context, see Marie-France Bureau, Le droit de lafiliation entre ciel
et terre: etude du discoursjuridiquequebecois (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2009) at 4.
6.
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms, PartI of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule

B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Prattenv British Columbia (Attorney General),2011BCSC 656, [2011] 10 WWR 712 [Pratten],
rev'd, 2012 BCCA 480, 357 DLR (4th) 660, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2013] 2 SCR xii.
8. Rhonda E Harris & Laura Shanner, "Seeking Answers in the Ether: Longing to Know One's
Origins Is Evident from Donor Conception Websites" in Juliet R Guichon, Ian Mitchell & ichelle
7.

Giroux, eds, The Right to Know One ' Origins:Assisted Human Reproduction and the Best Interests
of Children (Brussels: ASP, 2012) 57.

528

The Dalhousie Law Journal

some arguments advanced to that end are less persuasive or accurate than
others. This paper's premise is that arguments, such as those studied below,
have important effects. They enter a discourse that affects policymakers
and legislative drafters; inform judges' understanding of children's best
interests; code some family formations as better than others, sustaining
the legitimacy of the "bionormative" family;9 and shape decision-making
about reproduction, such as whether to use sperm from an anonymous
or a known donor.1 A misunderstanding of family law's role in securing
identity may engender unrealistic expectations on the part of adoptees
or donor-conceived individuals advocating for reform, although such a
concern may appear paternalistic. More broadly, unfounded arguments in
this area may intensify the harm experienced by people who do not know
their genetic relatives.11
Part I explains the case selection. Part II examines the evidence in
Pratten, including shifting meanings of "origins" and expectations of
the genetic donor beyond information. Part III reads the scholarly calls
for reforming Quebec's adoption law, which criticize open adoption for
failing to meet adoptees' identity needs. Part IV criticizes the case studies'
implication that it is possible to "complete" one's personal identity,
arguing that they naturalize the identity of those not adopted or conceived
by donated gametes. They exaggerate the role of "truth" and downplay the
role of fiction or fable in all identity construction. Pressing further, Part V
underscores a misleading account of what family law does for individuals
raised by their genetic parents and what it might do for others. Overall,
this paper is a reminder of the potential for comparative reasoning to
misapprehend that which it takes as the norm and, indeed, to reshape it.
This paper also underlines the limits of law as a response to the diverse
forms of human relatedness.
I. Case selection
Both the Pratten judgment and the scholarship advocating reform to
Quebec's adoption law present contentions that individuals' identityrelated needs justify legal changes. Both date from the past half-decade.
9.
Charlotte Witt, "A Critique of the Bionormative Concept of the Family" in Franqoise Baylis &
Carolyn McLeod, eds, Family-Making:ContemporaryEthicalChallenges (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014) 49.

10.

Marie-France Bureau, "La naissance du droit aux origines" in Louise Lalonde & Stephane

Bernatchez, with the collaboration of Georges Azzaria, La normejuridique "reformatee".Perspectives

quebecoises des notions de force normative et de sources revisitees (Sherbrooke, QC: Editions Revue
de droit de l'Universite de Sherbrooke, 2016) 357 at 359.

11. Kimberly Leighton, "Geneticizing the Desire to Know: Analogies to Adoption in Arguments
against Anonymous Gamete Donatiof' in Baylis & McLeod, supra note 9, 239 at 242 [Leighton,
"Geneticizing the Desire to Know"].
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While a full demonstration would require work using other sources, this
paper proceeds on the hypothesis that its case studies densely encapsulate
a prominent, if partial, view of the significance of genetic relatedness.
This case selection is unusual, insofar as legal scholars often emphasize
"successes": litigation that reaches a jurisdiction's apex court or reform
efforts that produce legislative change. From that angle, the present case
studies are "failures." Pratten won at trial, only to lose on appeal, and
the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal; despite efforts in
Quebec, the adoption law remains unchanged. Still, there are reasons to
study the "failures, the trash."12 Failure may inspire "creative, innovative
ways to address problems."13 In any event, labelling this paper's examples
"failures" should not imply that their ideas have foundered. To the contrary,
their ideas have achieved substantial uptake.
Two differences between the case studies establish the interest in
combining them. The first is that their authors-of different backgrounds,
education levels, and institutional locations-wrote them for different
purposes and that they operate at different levels of generality. Scholars
working on adoption had presumably reflected on law's role in relation
to identity. In contrast, the affidavits excerpted in the Prattenjudgment
emerged in the course of litigation. While they purport to represent the
"experience" of particular donor-conceived individuals, 4 they likely
do not transmit unmediated, "authentic" voices. 5 For example, it is
impossible to know whether the donor-conceived individuals in Pratten
believed themselves to be situated similarly to adoptees, or whether such
views result from the frame of the constitutional guarantee of equality
(although the analogy surfaces outside litigation contexts). Relative
to scholarly work on adoption, the testimony in Pratten may be less
informed and explicit about what law can and should do. Since Pratten's
lawyer submitted those affidavits in litigation, however, they register a

12. Robert Leckey, "Thick Instrumentalism and Comparative Constitutionalism: The Case of Gay
Rights" (2009) 40:2 Colum HRLR at 474 [footnote omitted].
13. Adrian Little, "Political Action, Error and Failure: The Epistemological Limits of Complexity"
(2012) 60:1 Political Studies 3 at 17; see also Judith Halberstam, The QueerArt ofFailure (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2011) at 24 (failure opening onto "alternative ways of knowing and
being").
14. Joan W Scott, "The Evidence of Experience" in Henry Abelove, Michele Aia Barale & David
M Halperin, eds, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 1993) 397.
15. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Stuart A Scheingold, eds, The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure

and Agency in Legal Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); compare an effort
to document "the voices and experiences of children themselves": Lucy Blake et al, "Families
Created by Assisted Reproduction: Children's Perspectives" in Freeman et al, Relatedness in Assisted
Reproduction, supra note 1,251 at 251.
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seasoned advocate's strategic assessment that arguments foregrounding
the importance of genetic connection stood the best chance of success.
The second apparent difference concerns the role envisaged for law.
In Pratten, law's potential role is to collect, preserve, and distribute
information about genetic origins. In the adoption scholarship, law's
potential role is to name the connection between an adoptee and his or her
birth family. Reading the case studies together occasions reflection on the
extent to which law carries out those roles for other groups and to which
they are distinct.
II. Gamete donation and "origins"
Careful reading of the testimony incorporated into the first-instance
judgment in Pratten shows the averred right to access information about
genetic origins to have bundled several interests. Distinguishing these
interests is important. While subsuming interests under a claim of right
suggests that they are all peremptory, they rest on ethical and legal bases
of varying persuasiveness. In addition, different measures would vindicate
the respective interests.16
Pratten contended that the guarantee of the right to liberty and security
of the person, in section 7 of the Charter, includes a freestanding right
to know one's origins and genetic heritage. She also alleged that it was
discriminatorily under-inclusive, contrary to the equality guarantee in
subsection 15(1), for British Columbia to have legislated for the identity
needs of adoptive children without addressing the needs of donor17
conceived individuals.
The litigation's procedural path made the judgment a rich, relatively
unfiltered repository of a certain viewpoint on the part of donor-conceived
individuals. Pratten sought summary judgment-a determination of the
legal questions on the assumption that the submitted evidence was truerather than a trial during which her opponent could test her evidence by
cross-examination. The attorney general of British Columbia acceded.18
To that end, the parties filed approximately 50 affidavits, including, on
Pratten's side, testimony from other donor-conceived individuals and
from experts. Neither party requested or conducted cross-examination on

16. Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, "Donor-Conceived People's Access to Genetic and Biographical
History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity"
(2009) 23:2 Intl JL Pol'y & Fam 174.

17. Pratten,supra note 7 at paras 6, 7.
18. This choice may surprise, since many Charter cases turn on the evidence. It may reflect
confidence that the legal claims were weak, a sense that the government would look unsympathetic if
it contested the personal testimonies of Pratten and others like her, or resource constraints.
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the affidavits.19 The attorney general did not challenge Pratten's evidence
purportedly showing the "importance of knowing identifying and nonidentifying information about one's origins... and hardships caused by
donor anonymity."2 Nor did the attorney general dispute her assertion
that adoptees and donor-conceived individuals have the same or similar
psychological and medical needs to obtain information about their
biological origins.2 1 Whatever the reasons, the attorney general of British
Columbia did not even contest evidence presented in a "deliberately
dramatic" fashion.22 In a trial testing the evidence, the equivalence of
adoptees and donor-conceived individuals would have drawn dispute. One
distinction is that donor-conceived individuals were never relinquished
by their birth parents and are raised by the parents who planned their
conception.23 The judgment's tacit concession that donor-conceived
individuals suffer "genealogical bewilderment" would also have attracted
challenge.24

While enumerations vary, it is plain that the supposed "right to know
one's genetic origins" represents a number of concerns. Vardit Ravitsky,
a bioethicist, distinguishes four aspects,25 all present in Pratten. The
first is the medical aspect, represented in the desire to have a detailed
medical history.26 The second is the identity aspect, concerning narrative
information about the donor as a person. Pratten's claim foregrounded
this desire for "knowing about" anonymous donors via identifying and
non-identifying information, such as clinics might collect when someone
provides gametes.27 The donor's identity in this sense can be "discovered"
or "confirmed." 28
19.

Pratten,supra note 7 at paras 25, 26, 30.

20.

Ibid at para 34.

21.

Ibid.

22.

Lori Chambers & Heather Hillsburg, "Desperately Seeking Daddy: A Critique of Pratten v

British Columbia (Attorney General)" (2013) 28:2 CJLS 229 at 236.

23. Leighton, "Geneticizing the Desire to Know," supra note 11; see also Vanessa Gruben & Daphne
Gilbert, "Donor Unknown: Assessing the Section 15 Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring" (2011)
27:2 Can J Farn L 247 at 261-264.

24.
Pratten, supra note 7 at paras 94, 95. See e.g. Kimberly Leighton, "Addressing the Harms
of Not Knowing One's Heredity: Lessons from Genealogical Bewilderment" (2012) 3 Adoption &
Culture 63.

25. Vardit Ravitsky, "'Knowing Where You Come From': The Rights of Donor-Conceived
Individuals and the Meaning of Genetic Relatedness" (2010) 11:2 Minn JL Sci & Tech 665 at 668; on
the social interests clustered as relating to genetics, see further Shane K Green, "Openness in Gamete
Donation: It's Not about Genetics" [unpublished manuscript, on file with author].
26. Pratten, supra note 7 at paras 1, 19, 20, 42 (Olivia Pratten); see also at paras 49, 50 (Shelley
Deacon), 54 (Damian Adams), 56 (Victoria Reilly), 62 (Barry Stevens), 66, 67 (Kathleen LaBounty),
72 (John Hunter), 83, 88 (Dr. Lauzon), 92 (Dr. Ehrensaft).
27.

Ibid at para 19.

28.

Ibid at para 59.

532

The Dalhousie Law Journal

The third is the relational aspect, which involves the donor's full
identity, for making contact and attempting to establish a relationship. At
times, the desire for information functions as shorthand for the relational
aspect and a desire for "relating to" the gamete provider.29 For example,
John Hunter had obtained information about his donor, including his
hair and eye colour, age range, height, weight, a briefly stated health
history, and that, at the time, he was a student at the University of Western
Ontario. That Hunter wished, additionally, to know the donor's "ethnicity,
interests [and] occupation" suggests that he meant current occupation, a
biography updated across decades rather than a more detailed snapshot
of the donor when he contributed gametes. 30 Kathleen LaBounty wanted
to know what her donor "looked like, was he married, did he have other
children?" she wondered "whether he was curious about her.131 To satisfy
such curiosity, one would need to reach beyond accessing the information
sealed in a treating physician's records. The individual would need to have
a relationship with the donor, one including storytelling and the revelation
of thoughts and feelings. The identity and relational aspects of the right
to know thus intertwine, in an "elision of the right to know the parent's
32
identity, with the right to know and have a relationship with that parent."
Pressing the relational aspect further, some donor-conceived
individuals want information regarding their donor's "motivation in
providing gametes. 33 One expert, Professor Ken Daniels, reported that
donor-conceived individuals "want to believe that their donor acted
altruistically," rather than for money. 34 Under cover of a desire for
information, this wish is not merely for transparency and disclosure, but
for a particular motivation to have operated decades ago.
The fourth is the parental disclosure aspect, the truth about the
circumstances of one's conception. At times, "origins" refers to this
3
aspect, making "origins" the fact of conception using donated gametes. 1
Thus, although having no information identifying the donor, Pratten's
mother wrestled with whether or not to tell her daughter "the truth about

her origins. "36
29.

For "knowing about" and "relating to," see Carol Smart, "Law and the Regulation of Family

Secrets" (2010) 24:3 Intl JL Pol'y & Fam 397 at 405.

30.

Pratten,supra note 7 at para 71.

31.

Ibidatpara64.

32.

Jane Fortin, "Children's Right to Know Their Origins-Too Far, Too Fast?" (2009) 21:3 Child

& Family LQ 336 at 354.
33. Pratten,supra note 7 at para 109.
34. Ibid.
35. Ravitsky, supra note 25 at 668.

36.

Pratten,supra note 7 at para 38; see also at paras 70, 95.
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In addition to Ravitsky's four aspects ofthe right to know one's origins,
the judgment in Pratten reveals two others. "Origins" sometimes refers,
genealogically,to "a socially constructed bond between people linked as a
family," rather than to bare "genetic linkages."3" It does so where Damian
Adams, aware that his parents underwent fertility treatment because his
legal and social father, a paraplegic with kidney failure, was unable to
produce sperm, has nevertheless "no information about his origins: that
grounding that nearly everyone else has, a heritage and a connection with
the past."38 In effect, the "grounding" Adams desires would be genealogical
information about the socially constructed group to which he is linked
by donated gametes. The approach by which Adams has "no information
about his origins" exiles, from those "origins," any knowledge of the
father who raised him. It also effects an "erasure" 39 of the birth mother out
of whose egg he grew and who carried him in her womb.
The genealogical aspect is further present where unanswerable
questions about Pratten's "biological origins" touch on physical
resemblance and personal mannerisms.40 Since family resemblances "exist
only as part of a family mythology and hence are social,"41 a full attempt
to answer such questions might require storytelling by grandparents and
other members of the gamete provider's entourage. Justice Adair echoes
the desire for information's genealogical aspect by switching from the
language of "genetic information" regarding a donor-conceived individual
to the rhetorically loaded "truth of her biological heritage."42
The sixth, consanguineous aspect targets identifying information
about half-siblings and others genetically related. It appears in the wish to
avoid unwittingly committing incest through sex with a genetic relation.43

37. lain Walker, Pia Broderick & Helen Correia, "Conceptions and Misconceptions: Social
Representations of Medically Assisted Reproduction" in Gail Moloney & lain Walker, eds, Social
Representationsand Identity: Content, Process, and Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)
157 at 161.

38.
39.

Pratten,supra note 7 at para 54 [emphasis added]; see also at paras 34, 100.
Wanda Wiegers, "Gender, Biology, and Third Party Custody Disputes" (2009) 47:1 Alta L Rev 1

at 12.
40. Pratten,supra note 7 at para 41.

41.

Charlotte Witt, "Family Resemblances: Adoption, Personal Identity, and Genetic Essentialism"

in Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt, eds, Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005) 135 at 141.
42.
43.

Pratten,supra note 7 at para 52.
Ibid at paras 1, 20, 49, 50, 72, 86, 94, 111.
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This aspect also underlies the desire of some donor-conceived individuals
44
to develop (non-sexual) relationships with half-siblings.
Despite the judgment's dominant framing of the Pratten claim as a
quest for genetic information, the identity, relational, and genealogical
aspects-which are social, not merely genetic-are salient in the testimony.
Elements in Pratten offer credence to a scholar's judgment that genetic
identity is "a meaningless concept," since it "does not describe what is
missing if a donor's name is not known"; it is not "DNA alphabet soup"
that "donor offspring are perceived to lack. '45 Instead, donor offspring
may want to know "information about the means of conception and the
other people involved and their actions and motives," which has "nothing
to do with genetics at all."46 Similarly, curiosity and desire for information
cast "in terms of the child not knowing his or her genetic origins" often
bears more on "notions of the donor as a person. '4 It is time to examine
the second set of texts, regarding adoption.
III. Preservingadoptees 'originalfamily ties
A brief overview of adoption law lays the groundwork for Quebec's
proposal that legal bonds with the birth family might survive a child's
adoption. Although the legislature has failed to enact the proposal, several
researchers supported it strongly, underscoring the limits of open adoption
and the virtues of using law to recognize the child's genetic connections.
The scholarship reveals a conviction in the frailty, unreliability, or
inadequacy of social ties unconsecrated by a legal bond.
The "full" model of adoption terminates the legal bonds between
a child and his or her birth family and creates bonds with the adoptive
family. When adoption is "closed," confidentiality preserves the secret
of the legal transfer of a child from one family to another. In departure
from the closed model, "open adoption" is increasingly prevalent in North
American common-law jurisdictions. This term includes points "on a
spectrum.. .from the simple transmission of anonymous information...
44. Ibid at paras 67 (Kathleen LaBounty), 72 (John Hunter). See also at para 60 (Barry Stevens,
having identified 13 half-siblings, "delighted to have this new family" and finding "a greater sense of
membership and belonging" via "participat[ing] in an extended family"). See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, "The
New Kinship" (2012) 100:2 Geo U 367.

45.

Martin Richards, "A British History of Collaborative Reproduction and the Rise of the Genetic

Connectiof' in Freeman et al, Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction, supra note 1, 21 at 37.

46. Ibid at 38 [reference omitted]; see also Genevieve Delaisi de Parseval, "Comment entendre les
demandes de levee du secret des origines?" [2009] 5 Esprit 165 at 175 ("right to origins" less apt than
"right to a history").

47.

Susanna Graham, "Stories of an Absent 'Father': Single Women Negotiating Relatedness

through Donor Profiles" in Freeman et al, Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction, supra note 1, 212 at
228.
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to the organization of effective personal relations."4S Laws in several
common-law provinces foresee the formation of an "openness agreement"
or the issuance of an "openness order."49
Under Quebec civil law's regimes of filiation," the sole model of
adoption is full and closed. However, this traditional model is cracking
under pressure from changing attitudes towards extramarital births; the
adoption of older children from the youth protection system; and the
international adoption of children who look genetically unrelated to their
adoptive parents. In 2007, a working group issued its report.> In 2009, the
Liberal government prepared a draft bill.52 In2012, the Liberal government
introduced Bill 81." In 2013, the Parti Qudbdcois government introduced
Bill 47.54 Despite these efforts, Quebec's reforms have stalled.
The 2009 draft bill and Bill 81 proposed a measure inspired by French
law more than by the experience of common-law provinces and American
states. In France, "simple adoption" creates a new family bond. By
opposition to "full adoption," however, simple adoption does not cut the
ties between the adoptee and his family of origin. The adoptee maintains his
"family rights" regarding successions and the reciprocal support obligation
vis-a-vis the birth family subsists.55 In Quebec, the draft bill and Bill 81
would have allowed a domestic adoption that, akin to simple adoption,
preserved the prior filiation. On the proposal, judges could depart from
full adoption where doing so, "to protect a meaningful identification of
the child with the original parent," would be in the child's best interests.56
Although maintaining a legal bond, like French simple adoption, the
48.

Dominique Goubau, "Open adoption au Canada" in Agnes Fine & Claire Neirinck, eds, Parents

de sang,parents adoptifs:Approchesjuridiqueset anthropologiques de ladoption: France,Europe,
USA, Canada(Paris: LGDJ, 2000) 63 at 65 [author's translation].
49. See e.g. Adoption Act,RSBC 1996, c 5, ss 59,60; Child andFamilyServicesAct, RSO 1990, c
ClI, ss 145.1, 153.1, 153.6.

50. Quebec civil law theorizes parentage differently than the common law, through the institution
of filiation. Filiation is the legal bond connecting a child to his mother or father. Its effects include
the reciprocal duty of support, the mother's or father's parental authority respecting the child, and

succession rights in the event of intestacy. Robert Leckey, "'Where the Parents Are of the Same Sex':
Quebec's Reforms to Filiation" (2009) 23:1 Intl JL Pol'y & Fam 62 at 63-64.
51. Groupe de travail sur le regime quebecois de l'adoption, Pour une adoption quebecoise a la

mesure de chaque enfant (Quebec, QC: Ministere de lajustice, 2007) (chair: Carmen Lavallee).
52. Draft Bill, An Act to amend the Civil Code and other legislative provisions as regards adoption
and parentalauthority, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, Quebec, 2009.
53. Bill 81, An Act to amend the Civil Code and other legislativeprovisions as regards adoption and
parentalauthority,2nd Sess, 39th Leg, Quebec, 2012 (first reading 13 June 2012).
54. Bill 47,An Act to amend the Civil Code and other legislative provisions as regards adoption,
parentalauthority and disclosure of information, 1st Sess, 40th Leg, Quebec, 2013 (first reading 14

June 2013).
55.
56.

Gerard Cornu, Droit civil: lafamille, 9th ed (Paris: Montchrestien, 2006) at 450, para 293.
Bill 81, supra note 53, c123.
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model that Bill 81 would have introduced would extinguish all effects
of that original filiation, including parental authority and all reciprocal
rights and obligations between parent and child." It would not imply
contact between the child and birth parents. 8 The legal bond's survival
would crystallize in the mention of the first, abiding filiation on the postadoption birth certificate. 9 This proposal's symbolic use of a status of the
civil law, with no foreseeable legal effects, is exceptional.6" The enduring
filial status would allow the adoptee to say to the birth parents, with the
law's imprimatur, "You are still my mother" or "You are still my father."
The proposal would derogate from the prevailing understanding by which
Quebec law recognizes at most two parents.61
The proposal for an adoption maintaining a prior filiation had roots
in persistent scholarly advocacy. That advocacy included criticisms of
Quebec's full adoption as anachronistic, "conceived by a mode of rupture
rather than by one of continuity. '62 For the critics, open adoption, in which
information is no longer secret or inaccessible to the concerned parties,
problematically fails to call into question full adoption's "breaking of
ties," since it "always creates an exclusive bond between the child and
his new parents.1 63 These criticisms thus led to prescriptions for a form
of adoption that would preserve the original filiation.64 Maintaining the
original filiation, scholars say, would make it possible to give back to

57. The draft bill would have retained a residual support obligation on the birth parent's part:
Robert Leckey, "Le passe de l'adopte aux frontieres du droit" in Institut canadien d'etudes juridiques
superieures, ed, Droits de lapersonne:La circulationdes idees, despersonnes et des biens et capitaux

(Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2013) 487 at 498.
58. Bill 81, supra note 53, cl 51, which would have amended art 579 CCQ.
59. Ibid, cl 6.
60. Compare, on the changing reasons underlying the allocation of parental responsibility in England
and Wales-including a move towards parental responsibility as a pure status without content-Helen
Reece, "The Degradation of Parental Responsibility" in Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore & Jonathan
Herring, eds, Responsible Parents and ParentalResponsibility (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 85 at 102.

61. Commentators detect this limit in the requirement that, where a child has two parents, an
individual seeking to establish his or her filiation towards that child must also contest an existing
filiation Arts 532, para 2, 539, para 2 CCQ.
62. Frangoise-Romaine Ouellette & Alain Roy, "Prendre acte des nouvelles realites de l'adoption:
Coup d'ooil sur l'avant-projet de loi intitule Loi modifiant le Code civil et d'autres dispositions
legislatives en matiere d'adoption et d'autorite parentale" (2010) 44:3 RJT 7 at 23 [author's

translation].
63. Frangoise-Romaine Ouellette, "L'adoption devrait-elle toujours rompre la filiation d'origine?
Quelques considerations ethiques sur la recherche de stabilite et de continuite pour l'enfant adopte"
in Frangoise-Romaine Ouellette, Renee Joyal & Roch Hurtubise, eds, Familles en mouvance: quels
enjeux ethiques? (Quebec, QC: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2005) 103 at 107 [author's translation].
64.

See e.g. Alain Roy, Droit de l adoption: adoption interne et internationale,2nd ed (Montreal:

Wilson & Lafleur, 2010) at 29-32, para 16; Jean Pineau & Marie Pratte, Lafamille (Montreal: Themis,
2006) at 766, at para 478; Marie-Blanche Tahon, Vers l 'indifferencedes sexes?: Union civile etfiliation

au Quebec (Montreal: Boreal, 2004) at 68.
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the adopted child "the right to a true continuity of his identity and of his
family ties."65 This form of adoption "would name each individual's place,
limiting the destructive movements that arise from denials, things going
unsaid, and secrets." 66
The Quebec literature on reforms to adoption presupposes a distinctive
and significant role for state law. For some authors, "recognizing a place for
the parents of origin,
protecting the significant value of this [original]
filiation in the lived experience and in the imagination of the child,"6 or
cutting neither the "bonds of origin''69 nor "meaningful bonds""0 calls for
legal measures. This emphasis on the legal bond reflects the sensitivity of
these authors to the law's heavy "symbolic effects on personal identity,
irreducible to a simple matter of official papers.""1 Use of the synecdoche
by which "bond" is used for "legal bond" denies the potential for the
non-legal-the non-binding openness agreement of some common-law
provinces; the good-faith undertaking to exchange information; visits
between birth mother and adopted child-to participate in fashioning
the adoptee's complex identity. In contrast, common-law judges in cases
of open adoption, in which no legal bond of parentage subsists, speak
of maintaining a "parental... relationship" 2 or "ties" with the family of
origin. 73
Both the dissatisfaction with open adoption and the perceived need
for a form of adoption that would preserve the legal bond with the birth
family manifest a desire for law to order family relationships and to
define personal identity. They imply that a meaningful bond requires legal
recognition. This accent on the civil law's role in constructing its citizens'

65.
66.

Ouellette & Roy, supra note 62 at 25 [author's translation].
Ibid at 29 [author's translation]; see also Chantal Collard, "Les adoptions internationales d'un

enfant apparente au Quebec" in Ouellette, Joyal & Hurtubise, supra note 63, 121 at 138.
67.

Frangoise-Romaine Ouellette & Julie Saint-Pierre, "Parente, citoyennete et etat civil des

adoptes" (2011) 14 Enfances, Families, Generations 51 at 73 [author's translation].
68. Carmen Lavallee, "L'adoption coutumiere et l'adoption quebecoise: vers l'emergence d'une
interface entre les deux cultures?" (2011) 41:2 RGD 655 at 695, para 70 [author's translation].
69. Ouellette & Roy, supra note 62 at 15 [author's translation]; see also ("family ties") [author's
translation].
70.

Ouellette, supra note 63 at 118 [author's translation].

71.

Agnes Fine, "Probl&mes ethiques poses par l'adoption pleniere" in Ouellette, Joyal & Hurtubise,

supra note 63, 141 at 145 [author's translation]. For regret that, in discussion and in legislative drafting,

the identity dimension of preserving a child's original filiation overshadowed the preservation of the
child's belonging to the family of origin, see Frangoise-Romaine Ouellette & Carmen Lavallee, "La
reforme proposee du regime quebecois de l'adoption et le rejet des parentes plurielles" (2015) 60:2
McGill LJ 295 at 316-317.
72. SM (Re), 2009 ONCJ 317 at par 103, 70 RFL (6th) 421.
73. Family and Children ' Services ofAnnapolis County vAR-R, 2006 NSFC 28 at para 7, 29 RFL

(6th) 328.
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family identity aligns with other efforts for the state to control its citizens'
civil status and identity, 4 and it leads to a broader discussion of how
identity takes shape and what law's role may be.
IV. Identity as complex process,for everyone
Accentuating the difficulties of adoptees and donor-conceived individuals
distorts the process and experience of how others form their identities. It
effectively frames questions or problems relating to identity as distinct to
those not raised by their genetic parents. An alternative approach regards
such questions and problems as potentially common to all.
The prominent sense of personal identity in Pratten is relatively
static. It is a "fixed" notion of identity, rooted in genetics. 5 Thus, identity
is something that, with the proper information, one could "complete.""6
A closed sense of identity, anchored to genetics, enables Damian Adams
to feel that he is missing not part of his identity or certain strands, but
"half." The Prattentestimony reflects "a seemingly growing attitude that
one is not 'complete', is deprived of a fixed identity, unless there is exact
knowledge of one's genetic or biological origins."78 As the anthropologist
Jeanette Edwards puts it, "one strand of identity is singled out: knowing
the identity of the person who donated the gamete which led to your
birth means knowing where you came from, means knowing who you
are."79 Such a focus on knowledge of a specific genetic connection "tends
to obliterate all the other factors that might contribute to the ongoing
construction of personal identity.""0
Similarly, the adoption discourse in Quebec presumes a solidity to
identity such that preserving the original filiation would vindicate the

74. Consider the prohibition against changing one's name on marriage and the strict procedure for
changing sex on the birth certificate. Edith Deleuy & Dominique Goubau, Le droit des personnes
physiques, 5th ed (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 276-277, 319-322, paras 242, 291-296; see
also Marie-France Bureau & Jean-Sebastien Sauve, "Changement de la mention du sexe et etat civil au
Quebec: Critique d'une approche legislative archaique" (2011) 41:1 RDUS 1. For a somewhat dated
but still devastating indictment, see Viviane K. Namaste, Invisible Lives: The Erasure of Transsexual
and TransgenderedPeople (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) at 235-263.
75. Sarah Wilson, "Identity, Genealogy and the Social Family: The Case of Donor Inseminationf'
(1997) 11:2 Intl JL Pol'y & Fam 270.
76. Pratten,supra note 7 at 43 (for Pratten, "not knowing about her biological origins makes her feel
incomplete"); see also at paras 111, 232.
77. Ibid at para 54.
78. Jill Marshall, "Concealed Births, Adoption and Human Rights Law: Being Wary of Seeking to
Open Windows into People's Souls" (2012) 71:2 Cambridge LJ 325 at 348 [footnote omitted].
79.
Jeanette Edwards, "Undoing Kinship" in Freeman et al, Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction,
supra note 1, 44 at 56.
80. Nordqvist & Smart, supra note 2 at 25.

Identity, Law, and the Right to a Dream?

adoptee's "right to a true continuity of his identity and of his family ties.""1
Empirical researchers caution that attributing meaning and significance
to a genetic connection is a social process, 2 and that "deploying genetic
arguments in a highly visible manner" need not signal "a simplified and
geneticized reading of kinship." 3 Still, the selected case studies, especially
Pratten, foreground a genetically focused, fixed identity. 4
Perhaps unwittingly, efforts to depict a disadvantage distinctive to
adoptees or donor-conceived children sufficient to justify legal change
flatten and naturalize the identities of those raised by their progenitors.
Arguments for reform imply that the latter benefit from a sense of
"completeness" 5 and can "create the whole picture" about their identity,
origins, and medical history. 6 The premise is that for them, legal parentage
and genetic parentage overlap, up the family tree. Ifthey did not, the medical
history that children raised by their ostensibly genetic parents have would
be unreliable. Yet factors such as divorce, death, migration, estrangement,
and sexual relations outside a different-sex conjugal relationship can deny
a complete medical and family history to those other than the donorconceived and the adopted. More importantly, whatever the impact of such
factors, it is radically simplistic to posit as straightforward the identities of
those who are not adopted or donor-conceived. In Pratten,"living with a
number of highly personal questions that are never answered"" emerges
as a consequence of lacking information about one's genetic forebears.
A venerable tradition of literary, religious, and philosophical literature,
however, would take such permanent questioning as a shared feature of
being human.
The focus on genetic forebears as grounding a secure, complete identity
overlooks that individuals whom their genetic parents raise may not relate
closely to them. Many children raised by their birth parents fantasize that
they are adopted. Children may inherit their parents' "vertical identities,"
being born into a religious community or a racialized or linguistic identity.
In ways that parents may find challenging, even painful, however,
81. Ouellette & Roy, supra note 62 at 25 [author's translation]; compare a subtler sense of identity,
as the result of a process of authorship, in reference to an individual's need "to stitch the threads of his
personal history in a complex fabric of identity" (ibid at 23 [author's translation]).
82. Tabitha Freeman et al, "Making Connections: Contact between Sperm Donor Relations" in
Freeman et al, Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction, supra note 1, 270 at 292.

83. Janet Carsten, After Kinship (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 179.
84. The legislative specification that a judge would order the original bond of filiation's survival to
protect "ameaningful identificatioff' with the birth parent indicates that the measure does not target
the bare genetic tie, but the genetic tie serves as precondition for an identification worth protecting.
85. Compare Pratten,supra note 7 at paras 3, 111.
86.

Ibid at para 96 (Dr. Ehrensaft).

87.

Ibidatpara4l.
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children may also develop "horizontal identities," with no appreciable
connection to their genetic forebears. Consider the horizontal identities
of children who, against family expectations, turn out to be gay, autistic,
Deaf, or transgender 8 This paper's case studies redefine the "already
insurmountable difficulty of any human effort to know and fix one's
origin ' 89 as a burden unique to adoptees or donor-conceived individuals.
The claims in Pratten,and to a lesser degree those in Quebec's adoption
literature, obscure that feeling different in an alienating way or confusion
about one's identity is something that those groups may experience in
common with "all children. 90
Furthermore, an unsubtle sense of the "truth" about origins runs
through Pratten and the adoption discourse. In the adoption context, "[t]
he search for roots assumes a past that is there, if we can just find the
right file, the right papers, or the right person."91 So does the language
of "discovering" or "confirming" the gamete donor's identity. Recall
how, in Pratten,the desire for "information" sometimes involved a wish
for storytelling and for knowledge of motivations and feelings. Donorconceived individuals may want not only objective "knowledge," but also
a story that they can believe, 92 as part of a "process of personal history" or
a "narrative trajectory."93 The focus on accessing the "truth" and the sense
that denying such access constitutes a harm distinctive to donor-conceived
individuals call for acknowledging the role of storytelling and fiction in
the lives of those who are neither adopted nor donor-conceived. They also
invite reflection on the role of "secrets and lies"94 in "ordinary" family
circumstances.
The selected texts imply a false baseline by which children who are
neither adopted nor donor-conceived know their "origins" as an unwavering,
verifiable "truth." Instead, all origins are artifacts, constructed in response

88.

Andrew Solomon, Farfrom the Tree: Parents, Children and the Searchfor Identity (New York:

Scribner, 2012).
89.
Margaret Homans, The Imprint ofAnother Life: Adoption Narrativesand Human Possibility
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013) at 112.
90. Leighton, "Geneticizing the Desire to Know," supranote 11 at 255 [footnote omitted].
91. Barbara Yngvesson, "Going 'Home': Adoption, Loss of Bearings, and the Mythology of Roots"
(2003) 74 Social Text 7 at 13.
92. Sarah Polley, Stories We Tell (National Film Board, 2012).

93.

Marie-France Bureau, "Filiation et origines: questionnement et hypotheses sur le role du droit"

in Christelle Landheer-Cieslak & Louise Langevin, eds, Melanges en l'honneur d'Edith Deleury

(Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2015) 75 at 94 [author's translation].
94. Carol Smart, PersonalLife: New Directionsin Sociological Thinking (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)
at 108.
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to "needs felt in the present."'" Children raised by their genetic parents may
ask them a number of questions: Were you happy to learn of the pregnancy?
Would you two have married one another without the pregnancy? Have
you ever regretted having me? Am I partly responsible for your divorce?
Answers to these questions, delivered with love, may help children to feel
grounded and connected to the past (just as answers given without love
may destabilize or further alienate the child). Moreover, the answers may
change over time: the woman whose unplanned pregnancy appeared as a
curse and who comes to love the child might one day recount an origin
story of love. Such answers may not be "true," however, or perhaps the
truth they speak is familial or affective, rather than objective or scientific.
In a novel by Heather O'Neill, the narrator knows her genetic origins-her
famous singer father had sex with a fourteen-year-old at a party-and says
lucidly: "Ithink that all kids-no matter how acrimonious their parents'
relationship is-want to believe that at the point of their conception, their
parents had been in love.""6 Close reading of the testimony excerpted in
Prattenhints that some donor-conceived individuals desire not to access
the truth, but to hear fables equivalent to those spun for children conceived
"naturally." The upshot is that accounts centred on the search for "truth"
significantly understate the fictitious character of much of people's
"grounding" in the past.
Implications follow for law and policy regarding donor-conceived
individuals. Data captured on gamete transfer, such as the pecuniary motive
for donating, might not amount to the origin story that offspring will want
to hear. Alternatively, cognizant of many donor-conceived individuals'
desire for meaning, the donor might fib and say that he contributed
gametes to give the gift of life. Such information, entered in a database,
made available when the offspring turned eighteen, might help them to
fashion a story of origins. It would not be, however, the "truth." Measures
addressing the parental disclosure aspect-facts about the circumstances
of conception-may collide with the relational desire to know, like, and
respect the donor. That is, collecting and preserving accurate information
from the moment of gamete donation may thwart the desire for a fable
of origins tailored to circumstances, in the fashion of oral history, or for
altruism to have motivated the donation.

95. Homans, supranote 89 at 12; see also Bernard Golse, "La quete des origines: acte administratif
ou acte narratif?" (2013) 59 Enfances & Psy 144 at 145 (the history of an individual's origins "can
only ...
be reconstructed" [author's translation]).
96. Heather O'Neill, The Girl Who Was SaturdayNight (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2014) at 250.

542

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Taking up a more constructivist account of identity does not entail
ending the effort to expand access to information about individuals' genetic
origins, although it may reduce the intensity of discussion. Accessing
information relating to genetic origins may be part of developing one's
identity, without taking biological parentage as the "natural" or "authentic"
source of identity.9" Indeed, lack of information may pose a significant
obstacle in "the process of self-discovery and self-development through
reflecting on, interpreting and reinterpreting.., narratives of their different
experiences."98 Yet even if it is understandable that someone searching for
a missing element might focus on that element, perhaps exaggerating its
overall importance, the extent to which the discourse of genetic origins
can efface the kin-making work of gestation, labour, and family practices
is troubling. It would be preferable for the discourse on genetic origins to
recognize that "for most people the world over, including donor-conceived
people, identity is a complex matrix of social positions: it is neither
acquired in one moment nor in one event. Identity is not usually a steady
state, nor fixed, singular or given.""
If, ultimately, genetic information is relevant, why should those
advocating for law reform adopt a more accurate account of identity
formation, if a fixed, inaccurate version strikes them as more efficacious?
Here, a distinction emerges between the case studies. Arguably, legal
scholars writing on adoption (or any other subject) should not propagate
misleading images of anybody's identities. Pratten and other donorconceived offspring may not have the same responsibility as scholars, but
they might consider the appropriateness of amplifying the sense of loss
and harm on the part of those who lack information about their genetic
forebears and widening the perceived gap between them and others. This
paper turns now from conceptions of identity formation to the role of law.
V. The limits of law
The case studies hint at unrealistic expectations of what law can achieve
for donor-conceived or adopted individuals, and what it does for others.
Given this field's interdisciplinary nature, legal scholars arguably have a
responsibility to indicate the limits of law, and to be alert to differences
between what they mean by "the right to know one's origins," relative to
what researchers in other fields may mean."'

97. Marshall, supra note 78 at 353 [footnote omitted]; see also Freeman, supra note 1 at 15.
98. Wilson, supra note 75 at 281.
99. Edwards, supra note 79 at 56.

100. Marie-France Bureau & Edith Guilhermont, "Le droit de connaitre ses origines: chronique d'une
reforme annoncee" (2014) 73:2 R du B 597 at 613-614.
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In Pratten, the discourse in support of the "right" to know one's
origins reached beyond harms remediable by law. For present purposes, it
does not matter whether setting up a donor registry requires positive action
or whether abolishing donor anonymity would remove barriers to genetic
information for which the state was responsible. The question is the extent
to which even sympathetic lawmakers could resolve the claimants' issues
by legislating. Although the state could order the collection, storage, and
distribution of data about gamete donors within its territory, the strong
relational aspect of the "right to know one's genetic origins" signals
the limits of legal ordering. A regime of disclosure might offer donorconceived individuals the chance of a relationship with their donor
(depending on whether, say, he were still living), although the outcome
would be uncertain. Unquestionably, though, some harms cited in Pratten
lie beyond the reach of any legislature. Legal measures cannot satisfy the
desire for family storytelling. The motions judge quoted from the expert
Dr. Ehrensaft's evidence that some donor-conceived individuals "wonder
about whether their donor thinks about them" and that they may lament
it if the donor, once found, "wants no contact with the offspring he or she
has contributed to creating.""1 1 On prevailing understandings of law and
privacy, the sense of loss where a donor does not want contact with donorconceived offspring is not legally remediable. Inclusion of such testimony
in the judgment is a reminder that the "right to know one's origins"of which the "content, foundations, and extent are neither known nor
examined" 2-is more a norm or element of discourse than a legal right.
This sense of loss, like the desire for altruism to have motivated the donor,
gives the impression that, at times, claimants assert the right to a dream.0 3
Moreover, the calls for a form of adoption preserving the original
bond of filiation exaggerate what law does. The prospect that a new form
of adoption could "name each individual's place""14' assumes that family
roles fit into law's blunt boxes. The idea that preserving a legal tie to the
birth family would name the place of each individual with an important
emotional connection to the child wrongly supposes that law already does
so outside situations of adoption. On the contrary, legal kinship attributes

101. Pratten,supra note 7 at para 96.
102. Bureau, "La naissance du droit aux origines," supra note 10 at 383 [author's translation].
103. The efficacy of potential legal measures becomes less relevant if the chief ill in Pratten is,

symbolically or expressively, that the "exclusiof' of donor-conceived individuals from the province's
regime for adoptees "promotes the view that [they] ... are less worthy of recognition and protection"
(Mv H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 at para 73, 171 DLR (4th) 577). The testimony gives little sense, however,
that abolishing the regime for adoptees would be satisfactory.
104. Ouellette & Roy, supra note 62 at 29 [author's translation].
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a place to a few individuals as mother, father, sister, brother, grandparent,
and so on, whatever the lived experience of the child. Legal effects follow,
for example, in the law of successions. While "the lines of kinship and
marriage... draw the pathway of presumed affection,""1 5 the degree to
which kinship identifies ties of affection in individual circumstances does
not generally affect the operation of legal regimes.0 6
Furthermore, law omits to name meaningful figures such as stepfather,
godmother, and "auntie." Numerous connections and practices of family
remain unrecognized or unnamed by the state's family law. Think of
"othermothers," especially in the Afro-American context; 0 7 of aboriginal
customary adoption; 0 8 and of gay, lesbian, or queer practices of "chosen
family" ' 9 or "queer domesticities,.. 10 of which not all are reducible to
same-sex marriage. Strictly speaking, unmarried cohabitants or de facto
spouses remain legal strangers in Quebec, with legislative drafters implying
that they and their children do not constitute a "family.1 11 Consider, too,
the difficulties facing trans people, especially in asserting their status as
parents.1 Whatever the blind spots and gaps of law, families name each
individual's place, using diverse positions, statuses, relations, affective
ties, and truths that outstrip lawyers' constructs.
To be sure, that law fails to name some, or many, places in individuals'
experiences of family and kinship does not preclude efforts to expand
law's reach. It calls, however, for a fuller acknowledgement than marks
the adoption case study of how little law currently names. When it comes

105. Christian Jubault, Droitcivil: les successions,les liberalites,2nd ed (Paris: Montchrestien, 2010)
at 163, para 216 [footnotes omitted, author's translation].

106. Sanctions for "ingratitude" in the civil law of liberalities make a small exception. See Quebec
Research Centre of Private and Comparative Law, Private Law Dictionary and Bilingual Lexicons:
Obligations(Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2003) at 150, sub verbo "ingratitude."

107. Stanlie M James, "Mothering: A Possible Black Feminist Link to Social Transformation?" in
Stanlie M James & Abena PA Busia, eds, Theorizing Black Feminisms: The VisionaryPragmatism of
Black Women (London: Routledge, 1993) 44 at 45; see also Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils
of Marriage Equality: How African Americans and Gays Mistakenly Thought the Right to Marry
Would Set Them Free (New York: New York University Press, 2015) at 90-91.

108. See e.g. Ghislain Otis, "La protection constitutionnelle de la pluralite juridique: le cas de
'l'adoption coutumiere' autochtone au Quebec" (2011) 41:2 RGD 567.
109. Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship, revised ed (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1997).
110. Matt Cook, Queer Domesticities: Homosexuality and Home Life in Twentieth-Century London

(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
111. Beyond limiting spousal rights and obligations to spouses by marriage or civil union, the Civil
Code uses the adjective "family" to qualify such restrictively applicable measures. Thus, only married
or civil-union spouses have a "family residence" (art 401 CCQ).
112. BethAHaines, Alex AAjayi & Helen Boyd, "Making Trans Parents Visible: Intersectionality of
Trans and Parenting Identities" (2014) 24:2 Feminism & Psychology 238; see generally Dean Spade,
"Documenting Gender" (2008) 59:4 Hastings LJ 731.
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to adoptees and donor-conceived individuals, the baseline for comparison
cannot be the idea that other people's birth certificates, or networks of
legal kinship, name everyone's place.113 Moreover, rather than taking the
development and sustenance of profoundly significant relationships beyond
law's recognition as neutral, or as good-as a healthy counterweight, say, to
law's ambition to signal to individuals which relations they should valuethe push for reform in Quebec takes them as indicating state law's failure
or loss of control. Whatever the contingent contours of law's involvement
in defining family and individual identity, a fundamental commitment
to pluralism-in the forms of intimacy, in political attachments, and in
religious affiliation and its manifestations-highlights the necessity of
preserving ecologies of relating that law will not purport to regulate or
even to name.
As acknowledged in in the introduction, it is arguable that information
about donor-conceived individuals' genetic history simply is theirs.
Nobody has a better claim to such information, the argument would go;
truth is better than lies, and the full truth is better than a partial truth. 1 4 This
argument does not escape criticism. It appears insensitive to potentially
competing privacy rights; it may occlude genetic information's relational
implications; and, as explorations of the "right not to know" in the
genetic context hint, 5 it is risky to assume that the fullest technologically
available truth is always best. Whatever questions it raises, this truth claim
appears to play out differently for Prattenthan for Quebec's proposal for
adoption reform. In Pratten,the truth claim might support the demand for
law, administratively, to open access to existing information. Regarding
adoption, the truth claim might militate for loosening the confidentiality of
adoption files, but it would not lead to sustaining the legal bonds between
adoptee and birth family. Rather than working within the existing kinship
structure, the Quebec scholars of adoption-more drastically-sought the

113. See, e.g., Eric Blyth et al, "The Role of Birth Certificates in Relation to Access to Biographical
and Genetic History in Donor Conception' (2009) 17:2 Intl J Child Rts 207; Michelle Giroux &
Mariana De Lorenzi, "Putting the Child First: A Necessary Step in the Recognition of the Right to
Identity" (2011) 27:1 Can J Fam L 53 at 91 ("child's birth certificate" as a method "to facilitate
transparency and truth"); but see Julie McCandless, "The Changing Form of Birth Registration?" in
Fatemeh Ebtehaj et al, eds, Birth Rites and Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 187.
114. See, e.g., John Eekelaar, Family Law and PersonalLife (New York: Oxford University Press,
2006) at 76 (children's interests "in knowing the physical truth are always stronger than those of
the adults, because for children they give rise to claims injustice, whereas for adults they form the
basis for attempts at exercising power"); see also David Gollancz, "Time to Stop Lying" in Guichon,
Mitchell & Giroux, supra note 8, 340.
115. Julia Crouch et al, "'We Don't Know Her History, Her Background': Adoptive Parents'
Perspectives on Whole Genome Sequencing Results" (2015) 24:1 J Genetic Counselling 67 at 67.
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insertion of a new kinship form into the Civil Code, dispensing with the
two-parent maximum.
This formal distinction should not conceal, however, the effects of
making information available. Even if facilitating access to genetic
information advances the attractive goal of "maximi[zing] choice
and opportunity for donor-conceived people,. 116 doing so implements
contentious value judgments and functions as a form of governance. 1 7
Moreover, as the queer critics of same-sex marriage have pointed out,
achieving new choices does not simply enhance freedom against a
backdrop of stable preexisting preferences. Instead, new "rights" and
"choices" will reshape desires and priorities.1 Moreover, whatever its
positive effects, making information available in some situations, such as
donor conception, but not others, such as conception by extra-marital or
casual intercourse, 19 will signal some families as incomplete relative to
others.
Conclusion
This paper has registered the contemporary significance of genetic
connections to identity. That significance coexists uneasily with an emphasis,
in other areas, on difference as socially constructed, on the potential to
inhabit new family forms by virtue of intention and practice, and on identity
formation as a social endeavour. Indeed, it rubs uncomfortably against
geneticists' reminders of the need to contextualize what genes reveal about
human life and relatedness. 2 ' This paper has argued that claims for legal
change on behalf of donor-conceived individuals and adoptees exaggerate
the differences, in identity terms, between them and others. While it has
focused on case studies from Canada-the first-instance judgment in the
Pratten litigation from British Columbia and the scholarship favourable
116. Eric Blyth et al, "Donor-Conceived People's Views and Experiences of Their Genetic Origins: A
Critical Analysis of the Research Evidence" (2012) 19:4 JL & Medicine 769 at 788.

117. The Civil Code of Quebec stipulates that intended spouses must "be informed of the advisability
of a premarital medical examination" (art 368, para 2 CCQ), while the Code of Civil Procedure
requires attendance at an information session on the mediation process before the court hears a family
case, with limited exceptions (art 814.3 CCP). See further Helen Reece, "Leaping without Looking" in
Robert Leckey, ed, After Legal Equality: Family,Sex, Kinship (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015) 115.
118. Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
119. I Glenn Cohen, "Response: Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves,
Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands" (2012) 100:2 Geo LJ 431 at 443-445.
120. See, e.g., Nessa Carey, The Epigenetics Revolution: How Modern Biology Is Rewriting Our
Understanding of Genetics, Disease, and Inheritance (New York: Columbia University Press,

2012); see also Louis Maheu & Roderick A Macdonald, "The Changing Boundaries of Genes and
Social Environment in Perspective: An Overview" in Louis Maheu & Roderick A Macdonald, eds,
Challenging Genetic Determinism: New Perspectives on the Gene in Its Multiple Environments

(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011) 3.
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to a proposal for amending adoption law in Quebec-its insights are of
broader relevance. Discourse shaped for reform risks presenting donorconceived individuals and adoptees as bearing distinctively incomplete
identities, rather than as representing "in a particularly acute form the
problem of the unknowability of origins and the common tendency to
address that problem with fiction making." ' More than the case studies
acknowledge, the quest for identity may be universal and never-ending.
While this paper remains largely within the conceptual frame of identity
proposed by the workshop for which it was prepared, concepts such as
relatedness,12 or belonging,23 may offer promising avenues for further

research.
The reform efforts in this paper's case studies have not yet succeeded.
The crucial insight is that they sought more from law than it could
provide, or than it should. Researchers have approached questions of
adoption, assisted reproduction, identity, and kinship from fields such as
ethics, philosophy, medicine, anthropology, sociology, and law. Given
this disciplinary breadth, it may be helpful to have a lawyerly reminderinformed by the current constraints of family law in Canada's commonlaw and civil-law jurisdictions-of law's limits on this terrain. Law cannot
address all desires or name all affiliations, but those alert to the risks of
totalizing legislative ambitions will not lament such incapacity. Jean
Carbonnier, the great French sociologist of law who traced the relationships
between state law and the ordering of other normative regimes, poetically
captures the limits of state law in psychic and imaginative domains. "It
is psychically happy for individuals and for society, too," he writes, "that
each might imagine an alternative, more beautiful genealogy for himself
The danger appears when the state or states seek to fabricate rights to a
dream from the right to dream." '24

121. Homans, supranote 89 at 114.

122. Freeman, supra note 1.
123. See Vanessa May, Connecting Self to Society: Belonging in a Changing World (Basingstoke,

UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 9, suggesting that "the embodied experience of belonging ... allows
us to retain a complex view of the self as not made up of two-dimensional identity categories."
124. Jean Carbonnier, Droit etpassion du droit sous la VPRepublique (Paris: Flammarion, 1996) at

248 [author's translation].

